556
592
621 which housed his married son and wife and their child, and his other son who was a full brother to the first. Across from his son's compound was that of his full younger sibling and wife (no children) and next to that of his full younger sibling was the compound of his patrilateral parallel male cousin who is married and has two children. All these groupings are semi-separate compounds, but have openings in the straw mat walls from one into the other. They are all semi-independent economic units, having their own farms and dry season activity, which for all of them, except the senior man in question, [426] is calabash carving and marketing. The senior man is a money-lender [651] and has comparatively large farm holdings. He collects the tax from all the household units enumerated above and remits it to the Village 556 Head. The rest of the males involved plant, hoe and sow his farms, 621 and go on messages to collect loans, or sell something for him. He, 571 in turn, helps them financially when necessary, gives them gifts and [577] represents them before the higher community authorities. They, in their turn, often manifest some rebelliousness towards the senior's power but at the same time are the only people who ever openly defended the morally degrading activity of money-lending, which keeps their superior in his economically powerful position. The economic and social security which they gain by maintaining this extended household organization outweighs for them the shame of being attached to a money lender's household, as well as the annoyance in every day life of subservience to his power and authority.

557 Thus, the manipulation of the ingredients of power and
571 authority are major determinants of local groupings of people into operating social units, although they are imbedded in a discernible

583 This determines
434 that for the majority of the population, marriages take place from
[585] about November to the end of February. The exceptions to this rule occur among those with a steady source of income or access to loans.
583 The agnatic kin group plus own-mother, if she is able, can be counted
602 on to help as well. As we have seen in Chapter IV, exceptions to this traditional custom can be found when a relative is against a young man's marriage because it will deprive the relative of the social and economic advantages of the young man's dependence.

583 The Kanuri say that a man who is not in debt to his friends
585 after contracting and carrying out a marriage has no friends. In other
426 words, for everyone, except the extremely wealthy, it is a mark of one's
572 own social role in a relational network to borrow from friends at the time of one's wedding. Failure to do so is a declaration by implication that the marrying individual does not trust his friends well enough to become obligated to them. His friends may also suspect that he has enough liquid capital to be independent of them (and benevolent superiors). Such action may easily lead to a flurry of attempts to borrow money from the prospective bridegroom as soon as the wedding is over.
583 Finally, a young man may expect and borrow money from anyone, besides
585 the above, to whom he renders service and to whom he gives discipline-
426 respect. Indeed a compound head or any political figure knows that lend-
571 ing and giving money for weddings is a primary method of maintaining subservience of subordinates.

583 In Kanuri society there are two related ways of regarding
585 the cost of carrying out a marriage (male speaking). Firstly, there is the cost of the entire proceedings, including cloth purchases, gifts of sundries, soap, perfumes, oil, a ram, fees to participant friends, entertainers, bridewealth, etc., minus the gifts from the girl's family and

437 The discussion of marriage has served to illustrate
583 attitudes and behaviour within contractual relations in which goods and services are exchanged between persons and groups. Bridewealth is given by the man and his group of relatives and friends to the girl and her group. The closer the marriage is to being the woman's first, the more likely it is that her luwali (dispenser of marriage rights) and kin group take the bridewealth payments rather than the woman herself. [426] [571] Men borrow from relatives, friends, and superiors to obtain the money for marriage expenses. Thus a man's social relational network in Bornu is an important part of his capital reserve.

58 The Kanuri classify marriages into two major categories - virgin or first marriage (female speaking) and marriage with a woman who has been married before. Marriages are further subdivided on the basis of the kinds of relationships established by the wedding. The relationship between the man and woman may entail the seclusion of the wife within the compound (nyia kulle). This is not strictly an either/or category but rather a matter of degree, since all Kanuri men like to see their wives remain in the compound as much as possible. However, only the upper classes can afford to maintain and enforce such a relationship. The remaining categories can be regrouped under two headings. Firstly, there are marriages in which a man obtains a wife by virtue of his relationship to an extended household organization and its head. The household head uses his luwali role (and in some cases his influence over other luwali) to either strengthen or create obligatory relationships with other men. In some cases, these unions take the form of cousin marriages (nyia durbe). In others, they merely emphasize already existing superior/subordinate relationships, while in still others, they serve as the initiating circumstance for an attempt at such a relationship. As we have seen, gift marriage (nyia

554 (d) barber - they are ignorant; they know bad things (fear of witch-
829 craft) and magical malevolence which is also attributed
[789] to hunters, medicine sellers, magicians and Koranic mal-
lams.

554 (e) petty brokers - they take property to sell in the market that is
829 not their own, and then they give the money to
441 the property owner, but they never give the true
amount, they always keep their own share, they can
never be trusted. Good people could never do such
work. A broker is not vertically related to
others, he is an individual agent — it is often
difficult to find out exactly where he lives. His
non-attachment makes him less likely to be a per-
son whom people can trust. There is also much
reasonable experience behind his cheating, which
many know of to their loss.

554 Kanuri notions of status are such that any person who takes
[558] up any of these occupations due to economic necessity is not supposed
to be accorded as low a status as if he were born into the occupation.
This idea gives support to the value placed upon upward mobility in
[775] Kanuri culture. One mallam told the writer that he had read in the
Koran that people, who were of these low status occupations would
never reach paradise, even if they were good and proper in their be-
haviour all their lives.

• 426 The lowest occupation status is that of money-lender, for
554 it is widely known that this practice is contrary to the edicts of the
577 Muslim religion. In real life this approbrium varies a great deal
primarily because of the covert admiration given to money-lenders for
their material success which allows them the cash surplus to loan for
interest.

178 The colonial period has seen the growth of many new kinds
463 of occupations that require western education. At first, outsiders,
[167] often from the southern parts of Nigeria, were brought in to man the
few essential jobs in the mechanical workshops, the hospitals, and
the offices. Today, they are rapidly being replaced by northerners and
in Bornu, itself, by Kanuri.

452 not heal easily.

452 Money may also be obtained in small quantities from a local
426 money-lender, whose usual interest charge is twenty-five to fifty per cent over a short time span of one to six months. These loans may or may not include ran (collateral) in which the indebted individual puts up
452 a robe, a cow, a sheep, or some of his cash crop as collateral. This
426 latter method of putting up some of the cash crop has developed in the
455 last decade or so into a virtual selling of futures, rather than simple utilization of the crop as collateral. A man who needs money during the growing season can obtain cash for the promise of so much of his cash crop. Since the prices of the crop have been stabilized by the government, the money-lender is fairly certain of the margin of his return. During 1956-57, when groundnuts were bringing 55/- per bag, a man could get 20/- to 25/- per bag from a money-lender for his crops after the plants had germinated. Just how much of this goes on is difficult to say, for it is illegal, and is also carried on by cash crop buyers who have much larger cash reserves than local money-lenders. Again, it is customary, where possible, for a man who has sold a future, to try and save enough money from his non-farming occupation to buy someone else's future, so that at harvest time he can still obtain his yearly cash harvest. This obviously tends to spread the indebtedness, but to what extent is at present unknown.

426 If informants' reports are to be trusted, it would seem as if the actual amount of indebtedness at the local rural level at any one time in Bornu is very small, rising slightly during the growing season.(1)

(1) The writer's own rough calculation of rural indebtedness comes from a small sample of budgets. The only constant indebtedness which turned up was in the realm of operating expenses (see above p. 307); 18% of operating expenses among fifteen peasant male household heads was being carried on credit. This came to only 2% of the total annual expenditures for the budget sample.

602 334.
571 power and authority relations within the organisation of each residence
592 groupings. This brings us back to bərsum, for where the members of a residence grouping are obtaining the proper receipts for their subservience, their discipline-respect, then no matter what structural cleavages and conflicts are present the organisation remains intact. If, however, the subordinates in the residence association see themselves as not receiving enough for their discipline-respect, or envisage more desirable receipts elsewhere, either through independence or a transfer of their subordination, then cleavages in the residence structure emerge and the group splits up.

583 The discussion of marriage has served to illustrate Kanuri
571 attitudes and behaviour within contractual relations in which goods and services are exchanged between persons and groups. Bridewealth is given by the man and his group of relatives and friends to the girl and her group. The closer the marriage is to being the woman's first, the more likely it is that her luwali (dispenser of marriage rights) and kin
[426] group take the bridewealth payments rather than the woman herself. Men borrow from relatives, friends, and superiors to obtain the money for marriage expenses. Thus a man's social relational network in Bornu is an important part of his capital reserve.

581 The Kanuri classify marriages into two major categories, virgin or first marriage (female speaking) and marriage with a woman who
581 has been married before. Marriages are further sub-divided on the basis
593 of the kinds of relationships established by the wedding. The relationship between the man and woman may entail the seclusion of the wife
[565] within the compound (nyia kulle). This is not strictly an either/or category but rather a matter of degree, since all Kanuri men like to see their wives remain in the compound as much as possible. However,